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	<title>Comments for Latest Security News | SecurityExtra.com</title>
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	<link>http://www.securityextra.com</link>
	<description>News for the information guardian</description>
	<lastBuildDate>Wed, 13 Jan 2010 10:51:29 +0000</lastBuildDate>
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		<title>Comment on BitLocker, FileVault, dm-crypt, and TrueCrypt all hacked by Seymour Butz</title>
		<link>http://www.securityextra.com/bitlocker-filevault-dm-crypt-and-truecrypt-all-hacked.html/comment-page-1#comment-2827</link>
		<dc:creator>Seymour Butz</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 13 Jan 2010 10:51:29 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.securityextra.com/bitlocker-filevault-dm-crypt-and-truecrypt-all-hacked.html#comment-2827</guid>
		<description>But you granted the consent to search. Before the police finished their search the encryption interrupted the search. Therefore, since you already consented to a search, they are allowed to request your password as part of the continuing search.

I don&#039;t know the specifics of this case but the aforementioned seems extremely likely, and I&#039;ve never, ever heard of someone giving consent to the search and then being able to revoke that consent before the search is complete. You can say yes or no, not yes then no. In fact by saying yes then no the police are likely to use the &quot;suspicious behavior&quot; loophole to continue the search.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>But you granted the consent to search. Before the police finished their search the encryption interrupted the search. Therefore, since you already consented to a search, they are allowed to request your password as part of the continuing search.</p>
<p>I don&#8217;t know the specifics of this case but the aforementioned seems extremely likely, and I&#8217;ve never, ever heard of someone giving consent to the search and then being able to revoke that consent before the search is complete. You can say yes or no, not yes then no. In fact by saying yes then no the police are likely to use the &#8220;suspicious behavior&#8221; loophole to continue the search.</p>
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		<title>Comment on BitLocker, FileVault, dm-crypt, and TrueCrypt all hacked by d</title>
		<link>http://www.securityextra.com/bitlocker-filevault-dm-crypt-and-truecrypt-all-hacked.html/comment-page-1#comment-2662</link>
		<dc:creator>d</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 03 Aug 2009 19:05:15 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.securityextra.com/bitlocker-filevault-dm-crypt-and-truecrypt-all-hacked.html#comment-2662</guid>
		<description>yes you can revoke. it&#039;s called a CONSENT to search.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>yes you can revoke. it&#8217;s called a CONSENT to search.</p>
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		<title>Comment on BitLocker, FileVault, dm-crypt, and TrueCrypt all hacked by Jim March</title>
		<link>http://www.securityextra.com/bitlocker-filevault-dm-crypt-and-truecrypt-all-hacked.html/comment-page-1#comment-2615</link>
		<dc:creator>Jim March</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Sun, 14 Jun 2009 08:42:25 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.securityextra.com/bitlocker-filevault-dm-crypt-and-truecrypt-all-hacked.html#comment-2615</guid>
		<description>To defeat this attack, don&#039;t use standby mode if you&#039;re transporting your rig anywhere it might be at risk.  Crossing international borders is the number one worst.

There&#039;s another &quot;attack&quot; out there.  In one recent case, a guy crossing the border into the US let cops see his data.  They thought (right or wrong, I don&#039;t know) that there was &#039;questionable content&#039; on there.  Somehow the machine got turned off, and had hardcore encryption in place.  So they went to court and a judge signed off on a subpoena forcing the guy to give up his password, on the basis that once he&#039;d given permission to search he couldn&#039;t revoke it.

And a Federal appeals court (I *think* the Second Circuit in New York?) upheld this.

So: we cannot ever give law enforcement in the US permission to search our disks as we can&#039;t revoke it later.

Fortunately, this is the sole exception I&#039;m aware of to the US 5th Amendment right not to give up your password voluntarily.  So in the US, you don&#039;t have to hide the fact that you&#039;re doing encryption as you cannot be held in jail until you cough it up.

In too many other countries, the real risk is &quot;rubber hose decryption&quot; - passwords extracted via torture.  If there&#039;s ANY risk of that, and so far I&#039;m willing to say there isn&#039;t in the USofA, you have to go to either hidden encryption, or double layer where they &quot;force&quot; one password out of you not knowing there&#039;s another layer.  The TrueCrypt documentation covers these cases.

I&#039;m in the US and doing whole-disk &quot;in your face&quot; encryption through DM-Crypt (Ubuntu Linux alternate install CD).</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>To defeat this attack, don&#8217;t use standby mode if you&#8217;re transporting your rig anywhere it might be at risk.  Crossing international borders is the number one worst.</p>
<p>There&#8217;s another &#8220;attack&#8221; out there.  In one recent case, a guy crossing the border into the US let cops see his data.  They thought (right or wrong, I don&#8217;t know) that there was &#8216;questionable content&#8217; on there.  Somehow the machine got turned off, and had hardcore encryption in place.  So they went to court and a judge signed off on a subpoena forcing the guy to give up his password, on the basis that once he&#8217;d given permission to search he couldn&#8217;t revoke it.</p>
<p>And a Federal appeals court (I *think* the Second Circuit in New York?) upheld this.</p>
<p>So: we cannot ever give law enforcement in the US permission to search our disks as we can&#8217;t revoke it later.</p>
<p>Fortunately, this is the sole exception I&#8217;m aware of to the US 5th Amendment right not to give up your password voluntarily.  So in the US, you don&#8217;t have to hide the fact that you&#8217;re doing encryption as you cannot be held in jail until you cough it up.</p>
<p>In too many other countries, the real risk is &#8220;rubber hose decryption&#8221; &#8211; passwords extracted via torture.  If there&#8217;s ANY risk of that, and so far I&#8217;m willing to say there isn&#8217;t in the USofA, you have to go to either hidden encryption, or double layer where they &#8220;force&#8221; one password out of you not knowing there&#8217;s another layer.  The TrueCrypt documentation covers these cases.</p>
<p>I&#8217;m in the US and doing whole-disk &#8220;in your face&#8221; encryption through DM-Crypt (Ubuntu Linux alternate install CD).</p>
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		<title>Comment on The Necessity of a Computer Security System by schoolgal</title>
		<link>http://www.securityextra.com/the-necessity-of-a-computer-security-system.html/comment-page-1#comment-2552</link>
		<dc:creator>schoolgal</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 06 May 2009 05:44:55 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.securityextra.com/?p=261#comment-2552</guid>
		<description>If you are looking for a good hardware firewall then go for Cyberoam UTM. It also has other features such as VPN, Firewall, IPS, Content Filtering, Bandwidth Management, Multilink Management and Failover.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>If you are looking for a good hardware firewall then go for Cyberoam UTM. It also has other features such as VPN, Firewall, IPS, Content Filtering, Bandwidth Management, Multilink Management and Failover.</p>
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		<title>Comment on Can IT Security Be &#8216;Green&#8217;? by Jon Selby</title>
		<link>http://www.securityextra.com/can-it-security-be-green.html/comment-page-1#comment-794</link>
		<dc:creator>Jon Selby</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 19 May 2008 09:03:00 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.securityextra.com/can-it-security-be-green.html#comment-794</guid>
		<description>The disposal aspect of green IT security is an important subject to raise. Far and away the best environmentally sound end of life soluton is to re-use equipment, but this in itself can often be a security concern. 

Without exception, companies should look for a specialist disposal organisation that can guarantee secure data erasure. The process should be accredited to Infosec 5 standards with a similar HM Government vetting of the physical security of the premises the equipment is stored in.

The other advantage of using a specialist IT disposal expert is that following disposal, equipment can be re-used, as opposed to recycled. This then means that revenue return can be used to cover the data erasure and other service costs. In Tier 1&#039;s case, 85% of our clients pay nothing for a secure and ethical service, with the majority actually receiving revenue back. When green services are usually accompanied by a premium price tag, this makes a refreshing change, and the Cost / Risk conundrum is made considerably easier to handle.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>The disposal aspect of green IT security is an important subject to raise. Far and away the best environmentally sound end of life soluton is to re-use equipment, but this in itself can often be a security concern. </p>
<p>Without exception, companies should look for a specialist disposal organisation that can guarantee secure data erasure. The process should be accredited to Infosec 5 standards with a similar HM Government vetting of the physical security of the premises the equipment is stored in.</p>
<p>The other advantage of using a specialist IT disposal expert is that following disposal, equipment can be re-used, as opposed to recycled. This then means that revenue return can be used to cover the data erasure and other service costs. In Tier 1&#8217;s case, 85% of our clients pay nothing for a secure and ethical service, with the majority actually receiving revenue back. When green services are usually accompanied by a premium price tag, this makes a refreshing change, and the Cost / Risk conundrum is made considerably easier to handle.</p>
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		<title>Comment on HSBC Bank loses 370,000 personal customers details on cd by Curly</title>
		<link>http://www.securityextra.com/hsbc-bank-loses-370000-personal-customers-details-on-cd.html/comment-page-1#comment-200</link>
		<dc:creator>Curly</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 07 Apr 2008 22:20:38 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.securityextra.com/hsbc-bank-loses-370000-personal-customers-details-on-cd.html#comment-200</guid>
		<description>At least we now know why they chose &lt;a href=&quot;http://curly15.wordpress.com/2008/04/07/hsbc/&quot; rel=&quot;nofollow&quot;&gt;that logo&lt;/a&gt;!</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>At least we now know why they chose <a href="http://curly15.wordpress.com/2008/04/07/hsbc/" rel="nofollow">that logo</a>!</p>
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		<title>Comment on The next generation of secure email delivery by Rick</title>
		<link>http://www.securityextra.com/the-next-generation-of-secure-email-delivery.html/comment-page-1#comment-184</link>
		<dc:creator>Rick</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 01 Apr 2008 21:29:03 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.securityextra.com/the-next-generation-of-secure-email-delivery.html#comment-184</guid>
		<description>Using public key encryption is really not as difficult as you make it sound.  Yes the sender and recipient must know each other but, would you send a message sensitive enough to require encryption to a stranger?

Email reader plugins like Enigmail make encryption and key handling easy plus the system provides proof of the sender&#039;s identity.

Much more can be found on this topic at www.novo-ordo.com.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Using public key encryption is really not as difficult as you make it sound.  Yes the sender and recipient must know each other but, would you send a message sensitive enough to require encryption to a stranger?</p>
<p>Email reader plugins like Enigmail make encryption and key handling easy plus the system provides proof of the sender&#8217;s identity.</p>
<p>Much more can be found on this topic at <a href="http://www.novo-ordo.com" rel="nofollow">http://www.novo-ordo.com</a>.</p>
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		<title>Comment on The future of two-factor authentication by Dean Spaccavento</title>
		<link>http://www.securityextra.com/the-future-of-two-factor-authentication.html/comment-page-1#comment-120</link>
		<dc:creator>Dean Spaccavento</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 11 Mar 2008 05:11:55 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.securityextra.com/the-future-of-two-factor-authentication.html#comment-120</guid>
		<description>Yep, SMS is a fantastic option for two-factor authentication. At Gardanto, we did some work about four years ago and identified SMS as the two-factor authentication option that would secure the most people for the least cost.

More than that, we realised some time ago that a two-factor authentication as a managed service would be something that would allow even more people to secure their networks. So we built it, and it is proving to be successful product. Google for Gardanto if you&#039;re curious.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Yep, SMS is a fantastic option for two-factor authentication. At Gardanto, we did some work about four years ago and identified SMS as the two-factor authentication option that would secure the most people for the least cost.</p>
<p>More than that, we realised some time ago that a two-factor authentication as a managed service would be something that would allow even more people to secure their networks. So we built it, and it is proving to be successful product. Google for Gardanto if you&#8217;re curious.</p>
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		<title>Comment on BitLocker, FileVault, dm-crypt, and TrueCrypt all hacked by Government encrypted laptop purchased on ebay &#124; Security Extra</title>
		<link>http://www.securityextra.com/bitlocker-filevault-dm-crypt-and-truecrypt-all-hacked.html/comment-page-1#comment-59</link>
		<dc:creator>Government encrypted laptop purchased on ebay &#124; Security Extra</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 28 Feb 2008 11:19:32 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.securityextra.com/bitlocker-filevault-dm-crypt-and-truecrypt-all-hacked.html#comment-59</guid>
		<description>[...] the encryption easier to crack these days (see this post), are you worried about your data showing up in some odd place like ebay for all to see?   Spread [...]</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>[...] the encryption easier to crack these days (see this post), are you worried about your data showing up in some odd place like ebay for all to see?   Spread [...]</p>
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		<title>Comment on Government encrypted laptop purchased on ebay by SecExtra</title>
		<link>http://www.securityextra.com/government-encrypted-laptop-purchased-on-ebay.html/comment-page-1#comment-58</link>
		<dc:creator>SecExtra</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 28 Feb 2008 10:49:42 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.securityextra.com/government-encrypted-laptop-purchased-on-ebay.html#comment-58</guid>
		<description>Anyone want to suggest how much the shipping will be on my bank details next week?</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Anyone want to suggest how much the shipping will be on my bank details next week?</p>
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